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Summary Supply chain attacks are lately one of the most practical ways to compromise CI: an action can be pinned, but the binary it downloads at runtime can still change upstream. Adding a checksum input lets users pin both the action code and the downloaded release asset, so workflows fail closed if that binary is replaced, corrupted, or unexpectedly modified. These changes: add an optional input verify the downloaded Bun archive before extracting it update the bundled action and README Why This action downloads a release archive during CI. Pinning the action SHA fixes the action code, but it does not pin the release asset that gets fetched later. A checksum input gives security-sensitive workflows a simple way to make that binary download fail closed if the asset changes unexpectedly. Testing
Does https://bun.sh/download has some kind of WAF or rate limiting mechanism? When I manually run curl on the runner it displayed but I coudn't see the reason. Also I can confirm that directly curl https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.0.33/bun-linux-x64-baseline.zip is ok. P.S. We use self-hosted runners and utilize the cloudflare WARP, but I think it shouldn't be a problem to setup bun.
Repository: oven-sh/setup-bun. Description: Set up your GitHub Actions workflow with a specific version of Bun Stars: 724, Forks: 108. Primary language: TypeScript. Languages: TypeScript (100%). License: MIT. Topics: actions, bun, github, github-actions, setup-bun. Latest release: v2.2.0 (6mo ago). Open PRs: 5, open issues: 14. Last activity: 6mo ago. Community health: 37%. Top contributors: xhyrom, Electroid, autofix-ci[bot], Jarred-Sumner, okineadev, tcely, maschwenk, adam0white, afonsojramos, andyexeter and others.